The End of Free Money
In October 2016 the International Monetary Fund barely mentioned government debt as an immediate danger. Its economists worried about weak demand and slow investment, and they expected the world economy to grow by 3.1 percent that year. Britain had just voted to leave the European Union, and the IMF expected central banks to hold interest rates low for longer.
Investors assumed cheap money would last for years. That assumption let rich nations carry heavy debt without strain and gave emerging markets easy access to foreign capital. Ten years later the IMF expects global public debt to pass 100 percent of world output by 2030, a level last reached in the years after the Second World War. How did government debt go from a quiet background number in 2016 to the central threat to economic stability in 2026?
The trouble started in the good years. In 2017 world growth rose to 3.8 percent, the fastest since 2011, and the IMF expected a fiscal expansion to drive the American economy above full employment. In April 2018 the Fund told governments to use the upswing to prepare for the next downturn. Most did not. The Bank for International Settlements has since shown that governments raised their primary surpluses as their debts grew in the 1980s and 1990s, but had lost the habit by 2024. They now spend hard in a downturn and cut back little in a recovery. Chile, Denmark and Sweden were among the few that saved in the good years. In 2019 world growth fell below 3 percent for the first time since the financial crisis, and the buffers the IMF had asked for were not there.
Then came the lockdowns of 2020. The IMF later estimated that world output shrank by 3.3 percent that year, the deepest peacetime fall since the Great Depression and far worse than the 0.1 percent fall during the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. Governments borrowed to pay wages, keep companies alive and fund hospitals. Low interest rates kept the cost of the new debt down at first, but the stock of debt had changed the balance sheet of the state.
The cost arrived in 2022. As economies reopened and Russia’s war in Ukraine drove up energy and food prices, the IMF expected global inflation to rise from 4.7 percent in 2021 to 8.8 percent in 2022. Central banks raised rates to stop high prices from taking root, and pandemic-sized debt met higher borrowing costs. In 2023 rising yields cut the value of the bonds Silicon Valley Bank held, and the bank failed. By 2025 governments’ interest spending had risen from 2 percent of world GDP to nearly 3 percent in four years.
By 2024 governments could no longer count on growth to carry their debts. In April that year the IMF put world growth five years ahead at 3.1 percent, its lowest forecast in decades. A year later the United States imposed near-universal tariffs, its trading partners answered, and American and global tariff rates reached their highest in a century. Growth held up in 2025 all the same, but the IMF found that governments made no meaningful progress in repairing their budgets. The global deficit stayed at 5 percent of GDP and gross public debt rose to 94 percent.
In 2026 that fragile arithmetic has met war and a second wave of inflation. The war in the Middle East has dragged on through the year, and the IMF now projects world growth at 3.1 percent and inflation at 4.7 percent, pushed up by energy and food. Investment in artificial intelligence has held up demand in economies tied into the technology supply chain, while energy importers outside it face higher import bills, weaker incomes and less room in their budgets, and many of the world’s poorest countries belong to that group.
The bond market has started to price the risk. Between February and September 2026 the average ten-year government bond yield in the Group of Seven rose by more than a percentage point, to its highest level in nearly two decades. The IMF names the oil shock and persistent inflation among the causes, but it puts high debt and heavy future bond issuance at the center.
Higher rates now feed through to budgets. The IMF projects the average interest rate governments pay on their debt to rise from 2.3 percent in 2021 to 3.7 percent in 2031. In the United States interest is set to climb from about 2.8 percent of GDP before the pandemic to 5.7 percent in 2031, about what the country will spend on Social Security. In low-income countries interest already takes more than 15 percent of revenue, against about 9 percent between 2011 and 2019. In a growing number of economies the rate on new debt now exceeds the expected growth of the economy, so governments must run tighter budgets just to hold their debt ratios steady. They are doing the opposite. The global primary deficit, the gap before interest, stands at about 3.3 percent of GDP in 2026 and is set to widen, when holding debt steady would require about 2.6 percent.
The way governments borrow adds to the danger. In 2025 OECD governments needed about $13.5 trillion to refinance old debt, close to 80 percent of everything they borrowed. Treasury bills, which mature within a year, made up about 48 percent of that borrowing, and the share of new bonds running longer than ten years fell to its lowest since 2009. Short debt costs less today, but it passes each rise in the central bank’s rate to the treasury within months. The buyers have changed too. Domestic central banks held 30 percent of OECD government bonds in 2021 and 20 percent in 2025, and the market now depends more on price-sensitive investors such as hedge funds, households and some foreign holders. In emerging markets more than a third of the bond stock falls due within three years, and in low-income countries more than half.
Treasuries face demands for cash from every direction. Germany is spending more on defense and infrastructure, and the United States has added a supplemental budget for defense. In a typical buildup defense spending rises by 2.7 percentage points of national output over two and a half years, and governments borrow about two-thirds of it. Within three years the buildup adds about 7 points to the debt ratio. In wartime it adds 14 points and governments cut social spending to pay for it.
High food and fuel prices are also tempting governments into expensive mistakes. When living costs jump, temporary cash payments to poor families are the cheapest form of protection. Many governments prefer price caps, tax cuts and subsidies instead. The IMF estimates that measures that hold prices down can cost 3 to 22 times as much as targeted transfers for the same protection, and producer subsidies in low-income countries sit at the top of that range. Fuel subsidies also keep demand high when supply is short and push world prices higher still.
Ten years ago zero interest rates let politicians borrow as if the bond market had no limit. They borrowed through the boom and the crisis, and when long rates rose they shortened their debts instead of cutting them. Today high interest bills, slow growth and war are straining public finances, and sovereign debt has become the central risk to the world economy.


