Missiles and Barges Tilt the Taiwan Balance
Missiles and Barges Tilt the Taiwan Balance
The military balance around Taiwan is shifting toward Beijing. Chinese missiles threaten to cripple U.S. theater airpower at the outset of conflict. New powered barges can land heavy armor on unprepared coasts. Together, these capabilities create a sequence that begins with missile salvos against American aircraft and ends with Chinese armor supplied across a beachhead. The September parade displayed the barges, drones, and strike missiles; a detailed study in International Security explained how they would be employed and what they could achieve.
Air superiority is the hinge on which blockade or invasion turns. Without it, Chinese ships and troops are exposed to air attack and supply lines collapse. With it, transports cross the Strait under cover, beachheads are held, and supply columns are sustained through weeks of fighting. A study by Nicholas Anderson and Daryl Press in International Security models this requirement and shows how it could be met. They demonstrate that the fate of Taiwan rests less on naval encounters or bomber strikes than on whether U.S. fighters can fly daily sweeps over the island in the face of sustained missile attack.
Their model links three processes: sortie generation from regional bases, missile strikes on aircraft parked in hardened shelters or open lots, and daily air-to-air engagements over Taiwan. The analysis covers thirty days of combat, using open data on aircraft inventories, base capacity, missile accuracy, and interception rates. The value is not in predicting outcomes with false precision but in showing which combinations of assumptions always lead to the same shape of war. In scenario after scenario, aircraft are destroyed on the ground in large numbers, sortie rates collapse, and commanders face pressure to withdraw forces eastward.
The numbers are severe. If U.S. fighters operate from six major peacetime bases in Japan and Guam, losses in the first month exceed 400 aircraft, almost 94 percent of those deployed. If they disperse to fifteen or two dozen fields, losses range from 299 to 424 aircraft, equal to 67 to 94 percent of the force. Even when dispersion is paired with jamming and improved defenses, losses still exceed 200 aircraft. In a favorable case, losses remain around 45 percent of deployed fighters. The study shows that losses on this scale are not anomalies but the expected result of geography, missile inventories, and the absence of hardened protection.
Doctrine matters. The Air Force has promoted Agile Combat Employment, which disperses and shifts forces among small airfields to complicate targeting. Anderson and Press find that ACE both fails and escalates. Movement consumes time, disrupts operations, and leaves aircraft parked in the open at small fields. Because the method only works if Chinese intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance cannot reacquire aircraft, ACE pressures U.S. leaders to attack Chinese ISR and command networks immediately in a crisis. This choice is escalatory because it blurs the line between defending aircraft and blinding an opponent’s space and communications infrastructure. The doctrine that is meant to enhance survivability risks expanding minor clashes into major war.
Hardening offers a more stable approach. The study models a campaign to add 300 hardened aircraft shelters across two dozen bases. Even assuming that China responds by improving missile accuracy, U.S. losses fall from about 300 to around 210 aircraft over a month. When hardening is combined with guidance jamming and stronger defenses, losses fall further, to about fifty aircraft. Shelters shift the exchange ratio: several accurate missiles are required to defeat each one, while the shelter itself costs less than a single fighter aircraft. Jamming multiplies the benefit by lowering accuracy, and missile defenses further shrink incoming salvos. This combination not only preserves more aircraft but also reduces the pressure to blind Chinese ISR immediately, because survivability buys time for political choice.
The timelines show the difference. Without shelters, the United States loses more than 200 aircraft in the first week, strike sorties decline from the start, and surviving units cannot sustain air sweeps. With shelters, jamming, and defenses, losses remain under two aircraft per day, and daily strike sorties hover near one hundred throughout the month. The difference between a collapsing posture and a sustainable campaign lies in whether concrete was poured before the war.
The study’s sensitivity tests reinforce the conclusion. Missile accuracy drives outcomes. If Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles are 50 percent more accurate than assumed, U.S. losses rise from 208 to over 330. If they are 50 percent less accurate, losses fall to about 127. Monte Carlo simulations that vary thirty-two variables still cluster outcomes between thirty and one hundred U.S. aircraft lost when shelters, jamming, and defenses are used. The pattern is robust. Geography and missile inventories create pressure; shelters and jamming blunt it.
These results link to amphibious plausibility. China’s powered barges, with extendable bridges for unloading vehicles, allow armor to land on beaches without ports. Combined with missile suppression of U.S. airpower, the barges enable an invasion that bypasses fixed infrastructure. The September parade displayed these barges alongside new carrier aircraft, four types of loyal wingman drones, multiple anti-ship and ground-attack missiles, and new torpedoes. Two stealth combat aircraft were seen in test flights in late 2024. These additions complicate defense and reinforce the narrow aim: secure local air and sea control long enough to deliver and sustain ground forces.
The modernization arc explains the pace. China has modernized since the early 1990s and seeks a world-class force by mid-century. The vast new command center outside Beijing demonstrates ambition. Officer purges show corruption and problems, yet investment continues. The orientation remains regional. China has one overseas base, in Djibouti; it is years from an intercontinental-range bomber; it lacks a global alliance network. Strategic airlift, aerial refueling, and blue-water deployments are growing, but the systems revealed in 2024 and 2025 are built for the neighborhood.
One option identified in Access Denied? deserves closer attention: South Korea’s unused hardened aircraft shelters. The Republic of Korea maintains roughly 770 shelters but operates only about 320 modern fighters of its own. This leaves a large surplus of hardened protection, far exceeding domestic needs. In a Taiwan scenario, these shelters could house U.S. aircraft at levels far higher than Japan, Guam, or the Philippines can provide. In effect, South Korea possesses a pre-built infrastructure of survivability that the United States cannot easily replicate elsewhere in the short term.
The political barriers are real. Seoul has been cautious about becoming entangled in the U.S.–China rivalry, preferring to focus its alliance commitments on deterring North Korea. A decision to host U.S. forces for operations aimed at defending Taiwan would represent a significant departure from this focus and would risk Chinese retaliation. For that reason, Anderson and Press treat South Korean access as hypothetical rather than assured. Yet the material advantages are too large to ignore. Each shelter costs millions, but the Korean inventory already exists. Gaining access would immediately alter the arithmetic of losses in the opening month.
The benefits extend beyond numbers. Using South Korean shelters would reduce pressure on U.S. leaders to strike Chinese ISR early, because survivability at those bases would be greater from the start. This in turn lowers escalation risks by giving Washington more political space. It would also strengthen deterrence by showing that U.S. forces could sustain operations even under heavy missile fire. In practice, survival in hardened shelters means that aircraft can sortie again after strikes, crews can continue to work, and supplies are less likely to be destroyed. For the first thirty days, this difference matters more than abstract measures of global capability.
Any agreement would require incentives. Washington might need to offer Seoul stronger security guarantees, new defense technologies, or broader diplomatic support to offset the risk of entanglement. Seoul might calculate that aligning more deeply with the United States on Taiwan increases exposure but also secures U.S. commitment against North Korea. These are political calculations, not technical ones, yet they illustrate how infrastructure can create leverage. Shelters already in place can be traded for strategic concessions, and the exchange may appear worthwhile if the alternative is regional instability and a weakened alliance.
This option shows how existing assets can change the balance without new construction. The United States cannot build hundreds of shelters across Asia in a few years. It can, however, seek access to where they already stand. Anderson and Press underline the point that survivability is not only about missiles and aircraft but also about alliance decisions and infrastructure access. Concrete is political as well as technical.
A Foreign Policy article warns of the broader trend. Stationing more U.S. forces in Asia faces political limits, and an arms race favors Beijing because Chinese marginal investments directly reinforce the systems that weaken U.S. posture, while U.S. investments must defend dispersed bases across wide distances. Dominance as an assumption no longer fits. The status quo—concentrating vulnerable aircraft at a handful of exposed bases—cannot endure.
The picture that emerges is cumulative. Missiles threaten every base in range. Agile Combat Employment fails to solve the problem and pressures for escalation. Shelters, jamming, and defenses reduce losses enough to sustain operations. Barges and strike systems wait to exploit local control. Each step fits within a coherent Chinese design.
War remains unpredictable, but patterns are visible. The past year’s revelations and the Anderson and Press study both show how the balance tilts toward China: missiles suppress airpower, barges land armor, and local superiority becomes feasible.
Survivability is the problem for the United States, and only material investment in base hardening, jamming, and missile defenses can alter the arc. The tilt is structural and lasting, and the sequence it enables is now plain.
Footnote
Factual material is drawn from Sam Roggeveen, “China’s Military Is Now Leading,” Foreign Policy, Sept. 3, 2025; and Nicholas D. Anderson and Daryl G. Press, “Access Denied? The Sino-American Contest for Military Primacy in Asia,” International Security 50:1 (Summer 2025), 118–151.