August 18, 2025: Sequence as Leverage
Sequence as Leverage
The center of gravity has moved from stopping fire to designing an end state. What was framed as a ceasefire-first path now runs the other way: a “comprehensive” settlement first, a ceasefire after. That procedural inversion matters because it resets who holds leverage when it can be used, and what must be priced in before guns go quiet.
Anchorage clarified the order without producing deliverables. A 30-day pause was proposed by Donald Trump and accepted by Volodymyr Zelenskyy; Vladimir Putin did not accept. The meeting ended early, the working lunch was canceled, and no specific points of agreement were identified from the podium. Yet the process did not stop. Trump’s line—“There’s no deal until there’s a deal”—kept talks open while the test he set for continuation was not met. The calendar moved forward: Zelenskyy was due in Washington on the Monday following the summit.
The territorial question entered the doorway with that sequencing. Moscow maintains claims to four Ukrainian provinces—Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson—and is described as controlling most of Luhansk. In Anchorage, Putin tied a potential “freeze” of the frontline to a Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk and Luhansk, effectively the Donbas. After more than 40 months of war, this condition puts the price of halting fire before the halt exists. If a comprehensive agreement must precede a ceasefire, then the territorial terms of that agreement become the gateway to any pause.
Washington became the stage for alliance management under this new order. European leaders flew in to join the Monday meeting at the White House. The invitations followed Trump telling Zelenskyy he could bring guests, and the White House extending the offer to several European heads. Ursula von der Leyen emphasized two anchors—security guarantees for Ukraine and respect for its territory—while urging talks among the presidents of Russia, Ukraine, and the United States. The format is deliberate: a bilateral that now opens to a broader table, not to change the past meeting, but to shape the terms of the next one.
Material roles have also been re-specified. The United States has stopped direct weapons deliveries under Trump, after $65.9 billion in assistance during Joe Biden’s term. European governments are increasing defense spending and military support. In June, nearly all NATO members committed to spend 5 percent of GDP on defense, with 1.5 percent of that classified as infrastructure only tangentially related to military spending. In parallel, Europe designed a program to buy American weapons for Ukraine with European funds—keeping the United States as supplier, but not at U.S. taxpayer cost. Trump, in a Saturday call, offered support for U.S. security assurances for Ukraine after the war, though details were not specified. In London, a statement from the United Kingdom commended that commitment and, with other European nations, reiterated readiness to deploy a reassurance force once hostilities cease and to help secure Ukraine’s skies and seas and regenerate its armed forces. The United States has not offered comparable specificity.
Words around the table signal how power is being framed as talks proceed. In February, on camera at the White House, Trump told Zelenskyy, “you don’t have the cards.” After Anchorage, he told a television interviewer that Russia is a more “powerful” country and that concessions would be required from Ukraine. Before meeting Putin, Trump had agreed with European leaders that a ceasefire must come first; after the meeting, he wrote that the best path was to go directly to a peace agreement. He also assured Putin that Ukraine’s application to join NATO would be put on long-term hold, a position his predecessor had taken as well. Process language—cards, power, sequence—now brackets the substance.
Economic pressure was invoked but not executed in Anchorage. Trump warned of “severe consequences” if Russia did not shift, argued that Russia’s economy “stinks,” and pointed to data: high inflation and interest rates, labor shortages, weak private investment, and an 18 percent decline in oil-related state earnings this year. No new sanctions were enacted at the summit. On the ground, Russia continues bombing cities and pressing for more land. The result is a timing problem: macro pressure described, battlefield activity continuing, threatened measures still potential rather than actual.
Across these strands, a pattern emerges. Sequence sets price; venue sets inclusion; financing sets endurance. Europe inserts itself into the room to keep the alliance aligned and to anchor security guarantees. The United States keeps its role as principal supplier but shifts who pays. A “freeze” is conditioned on withdrawal from the Donbas; a ceasefire follows only after a comprehensive agreement. The war’s duration lengthens the shadow on every decision, and the absence of enacted sanctions keeps the economic lever on standby.
Between the lines, the system now turns on whether procedure can organize substance: can an agreement-first architecture, backed by European financing and a still-unspecified U.S. assurance, produce a pause that does not pre-determine the map? Or will battlefield changes and the pace of material support reorder the sequence again, forcing talks to adapt to facts they were meant to shape?